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J.C.S. 1907/200

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1 May 1959

Pages 1243 - 1244, incl.

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REQUIRES	DATE
1965	1965

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)

The enclosed memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 28 April 1959, is referred hereby to the JMAAD for comment and recommendation, as a matter of priority.

H. L. HILLYARD,

J. O. COBB,

Joint Secretariat.

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E N C L O S U R E

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
International Security Affairs

Refer to I-13,690/9

28 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

Reference is made to the proposal advanced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 9, Tab B of the Memorandum* for the President on the subject above, dated 17 March 1959, which states:

"Expedite delivery (before 27 May 1959) of: (1) The undelivered portions of approved Mutual Security Programs with priority to NATO Allies; (2) Mutual Security Military Sales equipment to West Germany."

It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff explore the feasibility of accelerating deliveries of materiel in approved Military Assistance Programs and provide recommendations as to which materiel could and should be expedited in the event of a directive to implement this measure, taking into account other requirements world-wide.

/s/ Charles H. Shuff
Acting Assistant Secretary

* Very limited distribution; one copy each provided to CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, D/JS, DD/JS, J-3, J-5, and Secretary, JCS.

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9 May 1959

Pages 1265 - 1272, incl.

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DECLASSIFICATION.
REQUIRES *asp - still changed.*
DATE *1 Dec 1989*

REPORT BY THE JMAAD

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

EXPEDITED MAP DELIVERIES IN CONNECTION

WITH THE BERLIN SITUATION (S)

References: a. J.C.S. 1907/179
b. J.C.S. 1907/200

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9114 BERLIN/9105

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EXPEDITED MAP DELIVERIES IN CONNECTION
WITH THE BERLIN SITUATION (S)

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a request* by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 28 April 1959, to determine the feasibility of accelerating deliveries of materiel in approved Military Assistance Programs in order to improve Allied readiness and emphasize the U.S. decision to remain firm in Berlin in the event such action is directed.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 17 March 1959, the Secretaries of State and Defense, in a memorandum** for the President, recommended certain actions in connection with the Berlin situation. One of the proposed actions*** recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff states:

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"Expedite delivery of: (1) The undelivered portions of approved Mutual Security Programs with priority to NATO Allies, (2) Mutual Security Military Sales equipment to West Germany."

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3. On 28 April 1959, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) requested* the Joint Chiefs of Staff to explore the feasibility of accelerating delivery of materiel in approved Military Assistance Programs and provide recommendations as to which materiel could and should be expedited in the event it is decided to implement this proposal.

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* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/200

** Memorandum for the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense, dated 17 March 1959, subject: "Berlin Contingency Planning"; on file in Joint Secretariat

*** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/179

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JCS 1907/203

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4. On 5 May 1959, USCINCEUR in reply* to a query** by the Joint Staff stated, inter alia, ". . . we do not believe that any dislocation of the planned MA Programs, all of which are phased in the readiness of recipient to accept deliveries, will serve a useful purpose."

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion, see Enclosure "B" hereto.

CONCLUSION

6. Accelerated deliveries of materiel in approved Military Assistance Programs or contracted Mutual Security Military Sales is not considered feasible at this time as this would require diversion from U.S. forces or from production scheduled for U.S. requirements. In addition, accelerated deliveries would not serve a useful purpose due to the inability of recipient countries to accept and effectively employ earlier than now planned, such items of equipment as could be made available.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A" hereto, which reflects the above conclusion, to the Secretary of Defense.

8. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to the unified commanders.

* USCINCEUR message to JCS, Nr. EC 9-2485, DTG 051735Z May 1959 (DA IN 211670); on file in Joint Secretariat
** JCS message to USCINCEUR, Nr. 959033 dated 1 May 1959; on

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8. The U.S. Air Force in February 1959, reviewed war reserve readiness of MAP forces world-wide and has expedited deliveries where possible. 19.5 million gallons of JP-4 fuel can be delivered to Turkey as soon as storage is available. Delivery of IREM squadrons to U.K. and Italy cannot be accelerated being dependent upon production, construction and training.

ENCLOSURE "B"DISCUSSION

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1. The proposal* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March 1959 to expedite deliveries of materiel in the approved Military Assistance Programs, with priority to NATO Allies, and Mutual Security Military Sales equipment to West Germany, was made in light of the then existing political - military situation in connection with the Berlin "ultimatum". One of the purposes for accelerating deliveries was to display to our Allies and the USSR the U.S. determination to remain firm in Berlin. The degree of urgency for such a political gesture to solidify Allied support has eased in recent weeks with the improvement in the apparent unity and firmness of the Allied countries. Whereas there is still an urgency to demonstrate our determination to the USSR, the mere delivery of equipment to our Allies would serve no useful purpose. It is essential that it be apparent to the USSR that the equipment is being effectively employed by the recipient country, and not stockpiled, in order to achieve the desired result.

2. From the military viewpoint, it is highly doubtful that a significant improvement in the force posture of NATO countries could be achieved any earlier than now planned and reflected in the current MAP delivery schedule unless significant quantities of equipment are withdrawn from U.S. forces or diverted from production at the expense of U.S. requirements.

3. The military services have carefully studied the availability of items in the approved Military Assistance Programs for NATO Allies and the following major equipment could be

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/179

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Enclosure "B"

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made available for earlier delivery only by withdrawal from U.S. units or diversion from production.

Army

Honest John	11 Bns	11 Btrys
NIKE	9 Bns	
Armored Personnel Carrier	249	
Vehicles	686 -	
Floating Bridge Lt Tact	29	

Navy

Sidewinder	610
S2F Aircraft	36

Air Force

F-100D a/c	34
F-104 a/c	30
F-86D a/c	144
RF-84F	53
War Reserve Fuel Tanks (F-100)	5167
War Reserve 20mm HEI 2350(m) rds	

4. Even if made available earlier by diversion from U.S. forces, effective employment of the NIKE and new type aircraft would be delayed because of construction or training of receiving units.

5. In view of the impact upon U.S. forces, this course of action is not advisable at this time.

6. The United States can deliver immediately to Germany, 400 M-48 tanks under Mutual Security Sales, however, Germany has requested deliveries beginning April 1960 at the rate of 60 per month in accordance with the German Army build-up.

7. The U.S. Navy can accelerate, by three months, delivery to France of 7 P2V7 aircraft and 8 P5M aircraft. New delivery dates would be July 1959 and October 1959 at an increase in cost of approximately 25% to 30%. Terrier and Tartar missiles and launchers cannot be expedited due to production and ship construction schedules.

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Enclosure "B"

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "I")

15 May 1959

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 1907/203

A Report by the JMAAD

on

EXPEDITED MAP DELIVERIES IN CONNECTION
WITH THE BERLIN SITUATION (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 14 May 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraphs 7 and 8 of J.C.S. 1907/203.
2. Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 1267 and to destroy the superseded page by burning.
3. The memorandum in Enclosure "A" was forwarded as JCSM-183-59, dated 15 May 1959, to the Secretary of Defense.
4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in the matter, the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of J.C.S. 1907/203.

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H. L. HILLYARD,
J. O. COBB,
Joint Secretariat.

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BERLIN/91057

ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Expedited MAP Deliveries in Connection
with the Berlin Situation (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum* by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, dated 28 April 1959, subject: "Berlin Contingency Planning (U)", in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to explore the feasibility of accelerating deliveries of materiel in approved Military Assistance Programs, with priority to NATO Allies, and Mutual Security Military Sales equipment to West Germany.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this proposed action in light of the latest military - political developments in the Berlin situation and do not believe accelerated deliveries of materiel at this time will serve any useful purpose. USCINCEUR has been queried on this matter and agrees** with this position.
3. Should subsequent developments indicate reconsideration of this course of action, any accelerated deliveries will be greatly limited by the ability of recipient countries to accept and usefully employ such items of equipment earlier than now planned. In addition, significant quantities of equipment could be made available for earlier delivery only by withdrawing them from active U.S. units or diverting them from active U.S. units or diverting items from production now scheduled to meet U.S. requirements.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/200

** USCINCEUR message to JCS, Nr. EC 9-2485, DTG 051735Z May 1959 (DA IN 211670); on file in Joint Secretariat

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4. Consequently, in any future planning regarding imple-
mentation of this action, the disadvantages of degrading
U.S. capability will need to be weighed carefully with the
advantages the United States could expect to gain in the
light of the political and military climate.

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